Kemalism, hyper-nationalism and Islam in Turkey by Cizre-Sakallioglu Ü.
Pergamon 
History of European Ideas, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 255-270, 1994 
Copyright @ 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd 
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 
0191-6989/94 56.00+0.00 
KEMALISM, HYPER-NATIONALISM AND ISLAM IN TURKEY 
OMIT CIZRE-SAKALLIOGLU* 
The rising and falling political fortunes of Islam and hyper-nationalism’ in 
Turkey over the long period of their evolution can best be understood in relation 
to the ebb and flow of Kemalism, the official ideology of the republic, named 
after its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atattirk. Kemalism was the secular, positivistic 
and rational ideology of the republic determined to build a nation-state out of the 
multi-national Ottoman Empire, and then to modernise it on Western lines. In 
general, as bases of state formation and legitimation, Islam and the radical 
variant of pan-Turkish nationalism have had an antagonistic relationship with 
Kemalism throughout the life of the republic. 
Both Islam and, to some extent, radical nationalism have challenged 
Kemalism on the very grounds of its r&on d&e. Both ideologies have claimed 
superiority in providing better sources of national identity, social cohesion, 
political unity and government tradition than Kemalism. Whereas Kemalist 
nationalism committed itself to a feverish programme of Westernisation, the 
overriding tenet of radical nationalist and Islamist forces has been a strong 
rejection of the Western paradigm of modernisation. Instead, both ideologies 
have advocated a return to traditional values and institutions, one supplanting 
Westemisation by Turkification, the other by an Islamisation process. The only 
Western element of the two has been their advocacy of the adoption of Western 
technology and science; for other reasons, they have also shared in the liberal 
democracies’ anti-communism. Islam and radical nationalism have expended 
much energy on trying to offer more efficient mechanisms for state-building, and 
as the political violence instigated by hyper-nationalist forces in the 1970s 
showed, for state-wrecking. 
Radical Islam and radical nationalism also differ sharply from the Kemalist 
principles of nationalism on two important accounts. The first is related to their 
conception of democracy and thus of the role of Islam in politics; the other is on 
the principle of territoriality. On the first account, it is true that the Kemalist state 
had a tutelary character and took the sole initiative in structuring and organising 
the state-society relationship including the role of Islam. On the other hand, its 
repudiation of Islam as the basis of legitimacy of the state, and instead, its 
adoption of the secular principle of popular sovereignty is a clear sign that the 
Kemalist regime intended to turn into a parliamentary democracy of the Western 
type in the long run. By contrast, both radical Islam and radical nationalism are 
against the Western-based notions of electoral mechanisms and participatory 
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democracy, although from time to time they have had to pay lip service to them. 
Both ideologies overrely on the state as the originator of all social change, one in 
the direction of Islam, the other in the authoritarian nationalist ideals of the 
leader. 
Furthermore, the concern of Kemalist nationalism was a territorial one, 
restricted to creating national consciousness only for the Turks living within the 
boundaries of the Turkish nation-state. While for the Islamists the focus of 
identity of the Muslims is supra-national, for the hyper-nationalists it is ‘pan- 
Turkism’ which aims at bringing all the Turks living in the neighbouring 
countries and in the ancestral lands of Central Asia under the leadership of the 
Turkish state. Another more ambitious ideal of the hyper-nationalists is 
‘Turanism’ which means uniting all the Turkic origin groups scattered around 
the world. It is true that at the initial stages of nation-building, Kemalism 
assigned some role to ethnicity as a central component of nationalism. This phase 
passed and hyper-nationalists gradually began to oppose Kemalist nationalists 
by the end of the Second World War. 
Relations between ethnic nationalism and religion itself in Turkey have been as 
complex and curvilinear as in the other countries in the Middle East,* Similarly, 
the value and norm structures they have maintained among their adherents have 
sometimes been ‘reinforcing’, at other times ‘conflicting’,3 considering the fact 
that religion has provided the indispensable ingredient of national identity both 
in Turkey and in the region. 
Following the inception of the Republic in 1923, the early years furnish us with 
the example of secular ethnic nationalism replacing Islam as the source of state 
legitimacy, while in the 1970s and the 198Os, ethnic hyper-nationalism has 
incorporated more and more Islamic themes into its discourse. Moreover, the 
radical Islam of the 1980s was involved in a struggle to dismantle the secular basis 
of the Kemalist nation-state and restructure it on the basis of Islamic maxims. In 
what follows, an attempt will be made to trace the structural and dynamic 
properties of the relationship between Kemalism, the still-official ideology of the 
state, and its mostly opposing but sometimes collaborating rivals of Islam and 
hyper-nationalism. 
KEMALISM AND ISLAM 
In Turkey in the 199Os, it seems beyond doubt that the principal political 
challenge to the still-secular state comes from political Islamists. In a country 
where Islam has always been part of the national ‘identity’, but not necessarily 
practised as a militant instrument of political opposition, the secularist camp is 
alarmed by the increasing manifestations of Islam as a radical religio-political 
movement. To understand fully the relationship between Kemalism and Islam, it 
is imperative to begin with the present, and then go back to the past. 
The present strength of radical Islam can be seen in its major impact on the 
social and political life of Turkey in the last decade: to begin with, religious 
instruction in primary and secondary schools became an article of the new 
constitution of 1982, allegedly to pre-empt the Islamic indoctrination under way 
in countless private institutions run by Islamists. In addition, the activities of 
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Islamic orders: which had been banned in the early republic in 1925, have 
reached unprecedented levels, Stileymanci and Nakgibendi orders run unofficial 
Qur’an courses and youth hostels for needy youngsters who have come from 
provincial and rural areas to be educated in the big cities. Orders penetrate the 
ranks of government, business and society in general, with their ardent 
proponents of at least a semi-Islamic state. In its own publications, each religious 
group or order disseminates its specific views on and methods of returning to 
shari’a, the organising principle of social, economic and political life based on the 
Qur’an. The numbers and the circulation of these publications have mushroomed 
in the last decade. 
Some orders have found followers even among the military cadets of the 
military schools, bastions of Kemalist secularism, and have turned the 
universities, hotbeds of socialist movements in the 1960s and 197Os, into testing 
grounds for the religious headscarf to be worn by Islamist female students. One 
prime example of their appeal and influence among Turkey’s political leaders 
came in May 1989, when the mother of then-prime minister Turgut &al was 
buried next to one of the most important sheikh-leaders of the Nakgibendi 
religious order, Mehmet Zahit Kotku, in the graveyard of Istanbul’s 
Stileymaniye Mosque. The burial required a special decree of the cabinet and 
ratification by then-president ex-general Kenan Evren. 
In the last decade, apart from the activities of the religious orders, there have 
been other manifestations of fundamentalism which are extremely disturbing 
and unsettling for secularists from all walks of life. In recent years, eminent 
professors, intellectuals and journalists still promoting the concept of a secular 
state were assassinated by uncaught killers thought to be members of radical 
Muslim organisations. The concern of secularist public opinion is doubled when 
it sees radical Islamist ideology permeating all levels of society: from the banking 
system, universities and public figures, to the police, intelligentsia, liberal 
professions and the media. 
It is the contention of this article that what Turkey has been facing in the 
1980s and 1990s is a novel and original challenge of Islam to Kemalism rather 
than another instance of its historic endurance, as seen in the 1950s and 1970s. 
Above all, today’s challenge is the product of a deep-seated malaise which in 
itself is not explicable in purely religious terms alone, but in political, social and 
cultural variables extending over the whole republican era. A two-level analysis 
of present and past factors should be made. Since the early republic set in motion 
by its Kemalist foundation the firm oppositional character of Islam to the secular 
Turkish state, on the first level, historical analysis must survey the development 
of the relationship between secularism and Islam throughout the mono- 
(1923-1946) and multi-party (1946 onwards) periods. This historical perspective 
should also examine both ‘state’ and ‘society’ as two interrelated variables 
triggering responses to each other. 
Post-1980 Islamist forces, however, are not only products of the accumulated 
wisdom of the past, but also of the creation of the post-1980 state and its self- 
perceived constraints. On the second level, therefore, this analysis will focus on 
the more immediate context of the 198Os, its changing balance of political forces 
and ideologies, and the arterial sclerosis of Kemalism which became manifest in 
the last two decades. 
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Kemalist secularism and the pre-1980 Islamist challenge 
Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1918), precipitated by the 
defeat of the Central Powers and the November 1918 armistice, nationalist forces 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal launched a successful war of liberation 
against the colonialist Western powers, to preserve the integrity of the remaining 
Turkish region, the Anatolian Peninsula, as the basis of the new republic 
eventually proclaimed in 1923. During these early formative years of the 
republic, the six fundamental political principles of what came to be known as 
Kemalism were laid down They were reformism, republicanism, secularism, 
popularism, etatism and nationalism. The objectives of this ideology and the 
ruling Republican People’s Party (RPP) were twofold: to firmly establish a 
Turkish nation-state, and to ensure its -Westernist and modernising character 
unhindered by a state doctrine of any religion. In other words, religion was 
thought to be detrimental to the initial survival and then to the ‘progress’ of the 
Turkish nation-state because of the ideas, values, outlook and attitudes it bred 
both at the individual and systemic levels. For that reason, the eradication of the 
influence of religion from both personal and public levels became the utmost 
concern of Kemalist cadres, and thereby gave impetus to the eventual religious 
reaction. 
From 1922 to 1924, the sultanate, the caliphate, the Office of Seyh’iil-Islam, 
the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire, and the Sharia courts 
were all abolished. Between 1925 and 1930, religious orders and Ottoman-Muslim 
headgear for men, the fez, were outlawed. Swiss civil and Italian penal codes and 
the Latin alphabet were adopted. In 1928, the second article of the 1924 
constitution which stated that Islam was the state religion was annulled and the 
principle of secularism was inserted into the constitution in 1937. The 
secularisation reform package was intended to serve three functions; the first was 
‘cultural Westernisation’.5 Combined with the positivist-empiricist science- 
based thinking of Kemalist cadres-who were, after all, themselves products of 
the secular educational reforms of the Ottoman Empire-these reforms laid the 
cultural preconditions for modernisation of Turkish society on Western lines. 
This was a radical commitment, and there could be no compromise with religion. 
Secondly, and in political terms, these reforms were an attempt to shift the 
basis of political legitimacy from Islam to the French Revolution’s secular 
democratic principle of popular sovereignty. Secularisation in Turkey was part 
of the struggle against the ‘ancien regime’, the Ottoman ruling class. In this sense, 
it was and has been a precious formula for democratisation, that made possible 
the transition from an authoritarian mono-party to a more democratic, 
competitive party system. The extension of political participation to those on the 
periphery through the formula of universal suffrage, however, had a problematic 
feature: it would bring the periphery, with its religious orientation and tradition- 
bound outlook, into a political system based on the negation of Islam. This 
contradiction in terms was fortunately but only temporarily resolved by mono- 
party authoritarian etatism and its concept of populism which denied the 
existence of social classes. Since the economic model adopted was state 
capitalism, the strong, centralised bureaucratic apparatus was able to control 
and structure the emerging capitalist and working classes and coopt them into 
the system. 
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Thirdly and finally, the reform packet aimed at liberating the individual from 
the ‘oppressive’ constraints of Islam-as-culture in his own community,6 and 
creating ‘a new man’. One can easily detect here the fear of folk Islam, organised 
around a multiplicity of orders, sheikhs, sects, cults and practices, posing both a 
political and a cultural threat to the Republic. The government adopted a double 
strategy: on the one hand, Islam was put under central control by creating within 
the state apparatus a Directorate of Religious Affairs to regulate the religious 
activities of the public; on the other hand, through a more time-consuming and 
much more difficult route, modern secular values were inculcated into society 
through education and socialisation. It was hoped that over time the regressive, 
behind-the-scenes role of religion on the level of the individual would thus be 
curtailed. 
In its drive for secularisation, the Kemalist elite was also motivated by other 
concerns: in a country which was divided basically into two sects-the majority 
Sunnis and the minority Alevis (historically linked to but completely different 
from the Shiites in Iran)-the Kemalist secularisation process strove to foreclose 
the possibility of future sectarian strife coinciding with ethnic divisions between 
Turks and Kurds. The 1970s demonstrated the far-sightedness of that concern, 
Establishment of secularism as the pillar of the republic produced deeply- 
rooted tensions between the regime and the Islamic religion, and thus set the tone 
of religious dissidence for years to come. For one thing, moral outrage in the 
countryside at the Westernisation project produced conditions conducive to 
anti-secular movements. Kemalism has been criticised on this point, for failing to 
understand the role religion played for the individual,’ providing the basic 
ingredients of his communal self-identity and emotional security. His 
perceptions of the social and political system and of his role in that system were 
guided and conditioned by the religion he was born into, and he was not to be cut 
off easily from this source. The actual or spill-over effects of socio-economic 
modernisation were not speedy enough to produce the expected transformation 
of the cultural outlook of the individual, either. ‘In this sense, ‘fundamentalism’ 
and ‘revivalism’ -though admittedly subterranean for years-have had a much 
longer history than one usually realizes’.’ 
However, in the Republic’s first two decades, the politico-religious opposition 
on the periphery had neither the vision nor the means to organise an effective 
assault against the earthly phenomenon of Kemalism. Despite the problems of 
the long-term institutionalisation of secularism, the record of success of the 
mono-party years was impressive: ‘Turkey in the 193Os,. . . appeared an 
avowedly secular society’.9 Indeed, the activism, the vitality of its programme, 
and the democratic intentions of the Kemalist regime appear to have been 
responsible for the great following it secured among the urban intelligentsia. 
The peaceful manner in which the state party, the RPP, acquiesced in 
transferring political power to an obscure new party, the Democrat Party (DP), 
in the 1950 elections can probably best be explained by the RPP’s sincere 
commitment to political democracy of the Western type. The new democratic 
orientation of the post-war period in the West also facilitated the introduction of 
competitive party politics in Turkey. The DP won the next two elections of 1954 
and 1957 and stayed in power until overthrown by the military coup of 1960. 
The DP’s attitude toward religion was solely shaped by pragmatic 
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considerations of reaching out to a new political constituency on the periphery, 
the rural voters. It is not surprising that the DP, lacking a previously-cultivated 
power base both at the grass roots of society and in the bureaucracy by 
patron-client networks, discovered religion and identified itselfwith the cause of 
peripheral Islam. To put it differently, the DP’s courting of religion as electoral 
tactics was the product of the dismal failure of Kemalism to institutionalise the 
politics of secular opposition. Turkey in the 1950s was a polity with no known 
routes of political, participation and mobilisation other than general elections, 
with no associational life, and with ‘. . . a low institutional penetration of society 
by the state’.‘O If the result of this can be interpreted as ‘. . . a victory of the 
periphery over the center . . . ‘,I’ then it seems ironic that peripheral Islam had 
also discovered the secular political process. 
The first coup in the Turkish Republic, in 1960, represented a watershed in the 
Turkish political landscape, particularly for the role of Islam. The new 
constitution of 1961 was a monument in its reaction to the authoritarian policies 
of the DP, incorporating measures of liberal democracy and political pluralism. 
Basic rights and liberties were introduced; associational freedoms were 
established; a process to resolve conflicts and struggles in the political arena was 
institutionalised. It was in this last respect that the power of the Kemalist 
bureaucracy vis-&vis civil society could still be maintained, and the Kemalist 
version of secularism could still be safeguarded. Although religious freedom in 
the form of freedom of conscience and prayer was introduced, basing the state on 
Islamic rules was still outlawed, and as a result, any attempt to change the secular 
character of the state remained a criminal offense. It can be argued that objective 
conditions were the impetus for this political liberalisation and democratisation: 
Turkey’s pre-1960 political system had grown too antiquated to meet the needs of 
a polity becoming more complex and socially differentiated. 
The first pro-Islamic political party in the republic came into existence in 1969, 
in the more permissive climate of the 196Os, under the name of the National 
Order Party. After the military intervention of 1971, it was dissolved, soon to be 
replaced in 1972 by a successor party, the National Salvation Party (NSP), whose 
life-span extended until its abolition by the military in 1981. The party became a 
key partner in three coalitions between 1974 and 1977, and was the third largest 
party in the political system in terms of the seats it occupied in the National 
Assembly, even though both the percentage of its votes and the seats it had were 
reduced in the 1977 elections. 
The political impact of the NSP cannot be measured solely by the criterion of 
electoral returns. The party represented a breakthrough of religion into the 
political arena as it started to utilise the country’s major political platforms, 
actors and forms for its own causes rather than vice versa. The originality of the 
NSP therefore, lay most of all in its organisational novelty. It was a brand new 
form of Islamic expression, a modern political party, a radical departure from the 
forms of political agitation and opposition used by the heterodox peripheral 
Islam of the sheikhs, brotherhoods, spirits, and lodges. 
The NSP made its unique contribution to the evolution of modern political 
Islam in basing its strategy not on short-term electoral gains but on the long-term 
goal of promoting the role and importance of Islam in Turkish politics. It 
assumed that the precondition for the realisation of this objective was to wage the 
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struggle against the secular state on the proper political level, with a proper 
political form, and from a legitimate place. This, the NSP achieved beyond any 
doubt. The NSP also played a significant role in fostering the right social and 
psychological climate for unofficial Islam in terms of Qur’zin courses, 
publication of journals, and religious local associations, thus broadening the 
base and scope of the Islamist movement. Building an organisational network, 
the NSP also brought its Islamist appeal into the workplace, through a labor 
union (Hak-Ig); to young people, through its youth organisation (Akmcilar); and 
into the universe of professional groups via the party itself.‘* In addition, the 
party developed a close relationship with the Nakgibendi order. All in all, 
without the NSP, post-1980 religious radicalism would probably still have made 
inroads, but it could not have got the support of the top political figure, Turgut 
&al, and his ruling party. &al himself had contested the 1977 elections on the 
NSP ticket, and lost. 
The post-1980s: the modernisation of Islam or Islamisation of modernity? 
Why is the Islam of the 1980s and the 1990s feared so much by secular-left and 
secular-right forces? The primary characteristic of Turkish radical Islam is one 
which distinguishes it from earlier movements and yet represents an historical 
continuity with the NSP. In the words of Bruce Lawrence, who speaks of Islamic 
fundamentalism in general, but whose diagnosis fits the Turkish case, 
fundamentalists, ‘. . . espouse an ideology but not a theology, and perhaps one of 
their enduring values is to force others who use a variety of terms in trying to 
account for the Muslim world to recognize the chasm that separates theology. . . 
and ideology’.i3 This ideologisation has made Turkish radical Islam extremely 
political. Proponents of radical Islam claim that it is a political alternative to 
Kemalism, socialism and capitalism. Thus, the Islamic movement of the 1980s as 
a whole has broken with the historical tradition of siding with the status quo and 
has come to expound the notion of dismantling and then transforming the state 
on the basis of its ideology. l4 Only marginal groups seem to favour a violent 
method to achieve this end. The majority of Islamists do not opt for a revolution, 
because they expect to infiltrate and then dismantle the state structure from 
within. 
Another important feature which stems from this ideologisation process is the 
movement’s adoption of a more sophisticated and intellectual discourse for 
developing new ideas based on the Qur’an.15 It is precisely because the 
fundamentalists recognise the strength of Westernisation that they attack it with 
modern means of publication propaganda and the consumer paraphernalia of 
modem technology. A new, opportunistic symbiosis has been formed between 
non-Islamic modernism and Islamic orthodoxy. This was the natural outcome of 
the Islamists’ wish to broaden their political constituency to diverse elements in 
and outside electoral channels. This modernisation of Islam or perhaps, as the 
fundamentalists themselves would prefer to call it, the Islamisation of modernity, 
owes much to the efforts of the NSP in the previous period. 
The tide of Islamic extremism in Turkey in the post-1980 period cannot be 
claimed to be a revival or a continuation of the historical grievances of the 1950s 
and 1970s; they did not provide this much momentum for the movement. Nor is it 
a replica of what is happening elsewhere in the Muslim world. On the contrary, 
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the vigor and dynamism of the movement owes as much to the policies of the 
post-1980 Turkish state as to the seeds sown in the past. Why did this state accord 
i . . . Islam as a religious and social phenomenon unprecedented recognition since 
1980.‘?i6 There are some fundamental reasons why the state elites of the 198Os, 
both during military (1980-1983) and civilian rule, played the card of Islam. 
As the authoritarian reconstruction of state and society openly indicated, the 
first and foremost problem in the minds of the coup-makers and their civilian 
successors was rebuilding a tightly-integrated, indivisible (in terms of social class, 
ethnicity or sect), non-ideological and ‘consensual’ society, like the Turkey of the 
1930s. The past obsessional dedication of the Kemalist cadres and the army to 
‘national unity’ at the cost of political democracy, resurfaced. The military and 
its civilian allies, regarding themselves as the ‘guardians’ of the integrity and unity 
of the nations, concluded from the near civil-war situation on the eve of the 1980 
coup that Mustafa Kemal had been right in his rejection of social class, ethnicity, 
sects and religion in defining nationalism because of their divisive effects. On the 
other hand, they believed that the failure of Turkish political pluralism was, more 
than anything else, due to the influence of communist ideology and practice over 
the preceding two decades. The communist menace was thought to be many 
times worse than religious obstructionism or reaction. Furthermore, after the 
1979 Iranian revolution, religion was politically ascendant everywhere. Under 
the combined impact of all these considerations, Turkey’s rulers adopted a policy 
of reconciliation, recognition and tolerance toward Islam, which was to act as a 
unifying bond against communism. Religion was systematically promoted as a 
bulwark against communism and a substitute for class-based ideologies. 
The insertion of Islam into Kemalist discourse was, in part, due to the 
incapacity and helplessness of Kemalism against the rising tide of religion as an 
authentic and viable ideology. Faced with this tide, the military rulers tried to 
pre-empt the radical movement by emphasising their own commitment to 
religious orthodoxy. They missed the important point that the Islam they were 
dealing with was neither the folk Islam of the masses nor the officialised 
controllable Islam of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, nor the Islam of 50 
years ago. In this vein, compulsory religious instruction in primary and 
secondary schools was instituted in the belief that rising fundamentalist influence 
in Turkey was due to insufficient religious education. This strategy undoubtedly 
aroused mass support, and also was encouraged by conservative and liberal 
secular circ1es.i’ 
In the last decade, the political profile of Islam has come to combine both of its 
historic roles as stabiliser and destabiliser of Turkish society. On the one hand, it 
claims to be capable of replacing the secular state and of stabilising the polity. 
The problem, is on the other hand, how it would do so. Despite the conciliatory 
policies of the state toward it, fundamentalist Islam has almost insurmountable 
obstacles on its way to seizing state power, given the immense advances made in 
the life of Turkish society since the inception of the Republic. 
If radical Islam owes its present status to the tactical manceuvres of the post- 
1980 state, the same state, at a different historical period and under changed 
constraints, can do the opposite. As the 1990s unfold, radical Islam’s chances of 
overcoming the arch-determiner role of the state seem to depend on a list of 
factors getting longer with each passing day. 
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KEMALISM AND HYPER-NATIONALISM 
The relationship between Kemalism and hyper-nationalist movements and 
parties has been quite unlike the one between religion and Kemalism. For a very 
long time, at least until the 197Os, ethnic nationalism shared many tenets with 
Kemalism and presented less of a threat to the secular state than did religion. 
Moreover, hyper-nationalism was confined to a small circle of intellectuals with 
no claim, unlike Islam, to represent the periphery. Thus, the Kemalist state was 
able to cope with hyper-nationalist tendencies by coopting them, borrowing 
aspects from them, or simply suppressing them, with no fear of mass reaction 
emanating from the grass roots. 
Why pan-Turkism initially found favour among Atattirk and the Kemalist 
elite can only be answered by posing another question. If not Islam, what could 
serve as a bond for social cohesion? There were two potential candidates: a social 
class-based ideology of socialism, or hyper-nationalism, which glorified the pre- 
Ottoman origins and culture of Turks on the Central Asian plateau. Under the 
influence of the corporatist doctrines of Italian fascism, Kemalist populism 
denied class conflict and conceived the nation as comprising ‘the people’, the 
RPP as the ‘people’s party’. The aim was to preclude the possibility of class-based 
politics dividing the nation into competing camps. Thus, by a process of 
elimination of class and religion, the principal cement of national integration 
became ethnicity, and Atattirkist nationalism had to put its Turkic component at 
the forefront. 
Despite the affinity between official Kemalist ideology and hyper-nationalism, 
however, there were important differences between the two. The most radical 
difference was the essentially democratic nature of Kemalism, which, though 
often illiberal, was never anti-liberal. In contrast, ultra-nationalists expounded a 
basically authoritarian political discourse with emphasis on monism. The second 
major difference was on the issue of Islam. Since pan-Turkist nationalism was 
non-territorial, Islam turned out to be an important unifying component, 
alongside race. Kemalist nationalism, however, was confined to the territory of 
Turkey and repudiated Islam. Atattirk himself was highly critical of pan- 
Turkism with an Islamic tinge: ‘Ignoring frontiers and uniting all the world’s 
Turks is an unattainable goal. This is a reality established by centuries, and by the 
people who lived in the course of these centuries, through very painful and very 
bloody events. History does not bear witness to the success and global 
implementation of Islamism and Turanism’.“’ 
Hyper-nationalism and the Nationalist Action Party 
The genesis of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) was in the extra- 
constitutional 1960 military takeover. Some of the future NAP founders were 
members of a group of officers known as ‘the Fourteen’, who were catapulted 
into political power in 1960 as members of the junta. The leader of this pan- 
Turkist nucleus was colonel Alpaslan Tiirkeg, whose imprisonment in the 1944 
trials was a sign of growing intolerance of official nationalism toward a radical 
variant. The Fourteen advocated prolongation of military rule and implementa- 
tion of cultural and technical reforms to establish a truly radical nationalist state 
based on authoritarian maxims. However, they were ousted from the junta five 
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months after the coup by the majority of moderate Kemalist officers. The 
intention of the Fourteen was to form a political party to counter the rising 
Turkish left. Five years after the coup, in 1965, they seized the organisation of a 
small ultra-conservative party and changed its name to NAP in 1969. 
The NAP rejected outright the role assigned to Turkish nationalism by the 
Kemalist state elite in both the mono- and multi-party years, as a passive 
background ‘motif to unite the nation and increase the efficiency of the 
modernisation drive. The NAP embarked on a campaign to politicise and 
radicalise nationalism against communism, by mounting an attack on 
Westernisation. On this point of anti-Westernism, the NAP deviated from the 
Kemalist line. Modernisation, based on a Western model, was regarded as the 
root of all evil, since it had destroyed the nation’s values, culture, morals and 
ideals and paved the way for another alien ideology, communism, which aimed at 
dividing and dominating Turkey. I9 True enough, anti-communism was an issue 
which the NAP shared with Kemalists and the ruling continuum of liberal- 
conservatives, but since its ideology was bound up with its effort to uphold the 
image of a unique Turkish race, culture and identity, it could be not only against 
communism, but against Westernisation, too. 
Until after the 1980 coup, the most prominent component of the NAP’s 
nationalist discourse was, not unexpectedly, pan-Turkism mixed with Turanist 
and irredentist elements: ‘the specific name for Turkish nationalism is Turkism. 
Its definition is inseparable from that of Turkish nationalism’.20 This 
Turkist-Turanist ideology, although dominant, was to be diluted under the 
rising rhetoric of Islam, beginning with the historic Third General Congress of 
1969 when well-known Islam&s were elected into NAP policy-making posts. At 
this stage, the primary reason for bringing Islamic overtones into the ideological 
discourse of the party was the pragmatic one of numerically broadening the 
support base. The leader, Alpaslan Ttirkes, expressed this very clearly when he 
stated that ‘. . . the Turkish nation consists of devout Muslims. We want those 
who serve the nation to heed and pay respect to religion. It is necessary to take 
this into account in mobilising the energy of the people’.21 In addition, Islam, by 
way of its authoritarian outlook, offered the leadership an opportune way to 
control and mobilise the masses. 
The emphasis on Islam in the late 1970s was new in content and performed new 
functions: in line with the growing influence of radical Islam, it was strongly anti- 
imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-status quo. It was employed first of all to 
correct the criminal and lumpen image of NAP street militants in the eyes of the 
public by allowing these forces to adopt a more intense Islamic appearance. 
Furthermore, Islam was useful to discipline and control the party’s hooligans. 
There is no doubt that the religious image the party adopted was the biggest cause 
of its success in the 1977 elections; it increased its vote twofold by drawing voters 
from the supporters of the pro-religious NSP. With the Islamic colour that the 
NAP’s nationalism took, the rupture with Kemalist nationalism was complete, 
so much so that, as one leading spokesman of the NAP put it, ‘. . . Turkish 
nationalists are not Atatiirkist, but Atattirk is a Turkish nationalist’.22 
The NAP’s social base was too narrow for the party to expect to come to power 
through electoral politics. Thus, it hoped to accede to power through extra- 
constitutional routes, in a situation of political turmoil, public despair and 
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widespread discrediting of parliamentary democracy. In addition to the NAP’s 
‘Commandoes’, ‘Grey Wolves’, and later ‘Idealists’, as they were termed at 
various stages,23 who attacked left-wing intellectuals and partisans, the late- 
1970s witnessed the rise of a new form of political terrorism, sectarian violence, 
provoked and manipulated by the party for the same goal. The Sunnite 
population was mobilised against the Alevis and Kurds on the grounds that the 
Alevis were irreligious communists. Sectarian violence spread from town to 
town, and in 1978 reached the level of a massacre of about one hundred Alevis in 
a south-east town. Worse still, Alevi-Sunni clashes spilled into squatter 
settlements around developed urban centres via the importation of kinship 
politics through internal migration. The official Kemalist ideology on national 
unity was once more violated, and the Turkish political system was brought to 
the brink of breakdown. 
Hyper-nationalism in post-1980 politics 
The NAP was suspended and later closed down and banned by the leaders of 
the 1980 coup. NAP leaders and some NAP militants were subjected to lengthy 
trials. In the immediate post-1980 period, the adherents of the party were 
physically and ideologically in disarray, resentful of the same harsh treatment 
they felt they were subjected to with the Turkish left. 
The most durable successor to the NAP was formed in 1985 under the name of 
the Nationalist Labor Party (NLP), and in 1987, after the ban on ex-political 
leaders forming and leading new political parties was lifted by a referendum, the 
ex-leader of the NAP became the new leader of the NLP. However, most top- 
cadre policy makers of the NAP had been coopted by the ruling liberal- 
conservative party of the right, the Motherland Party (MP), a product of the 
structure and style of the new politics in Turkey. The MP, a broad coalition 
claiming to incorporate four main political traditions in Turkey-liberals to the 
left and right; hyper-nationalists, and the religious right-attracted NAP votes 
and even brought some ex-NAP cadres into government. The successor party of 
the NAP, therefore, had to be content with a much reduced power base. 
More importantly, the NLP continued to suffer a fatal and historic split into a 
pan-Turkist and an Islam-centred Turkist wing, a process which had started in 
the late 1970s. The latter wing has been much more dynamic and assertive mainly 
due to its young and energetic policy making cadres since 1980. The rise of Islam 
as a defining component of Turkish national identity is due to the generally 
more-Islamised context of Turkish politics. All right-wing forces have been 
propelled toward clutching ‘the rope of God’, as it is put by most politicians on 
the right. Even the former leader of the social-democratic RPP, Btilent Ecevit, 
and the new party he formed in post-1980 period, the Democratic Left Party, 
have turned to courting the more politicised religious voters. 
PROSPECTS FOR HYPER-NATIONALISM AND RADICAL ISLAM IN 
THE 1990s 
As Turkey moves into the 199Os, two developments, one internal, the other 
external, have come to play a central role in the future course and discourse of 
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radical Islam and Kemalist and hyper-nationalist nationalism. The internal 
development is the rise of the Kurdish question to the top of the Turkish political 
agenda. The external factor has been the collapse of the former Soviet Union and 
the after-effects of the 1991 Gulf War, the last obviously exacerbating the 
Kurdish problem. 
The Kurdish constraint 
The problem of Kurdish nationalism is a legacy of the past, especially of the 
strains of creating a ‘state’ before Turkish national consciousness had emerged. 
In its attempt to synchronise the formation of state and nation, Kemalist 
nationalism tried to suppress sociological forces like religion, social class, and 
ethnicity because of their divisive impact on national cohesion. The policy of the 
Kemalist state was shaped by one single concern: to preserve national unity and 
territorial integrity, and thus to guarantee the survival of the state. In time, 
however, because the task of nation-preserving became more difficult in the face 
of growing ideological and ethnic challenges, the manner in which the task was 
fulfilled also became more repressive. One unfortunate result of this was the 
refusal of the state to acknowledge officially a ‘cultural’ not political, Kurdish 
identity. If this had been done, say some 30 years ago, the present crisis might 
have been less political and more economic-cultural in substance. 
What are the prospects for possible responses of Turkish nationalism of the 
official and the radical variants to Kurdish nationalist demands for cultural 
autonomy or independence? To begin with, there have, until recently, been two 
common modes of perceiving the problem and offering solutions. The first, the 
‘black’ view, which has been adhered to by most state and right-wing political 
elites and by the bulk of the citizens, has denied even the Kurdish existence on 
Turkish territory, whereas the ‘white’ perspective, mostly of a minority marginal 
group, has unconditionally supported all Kurdish claims and complaints against 
the Turkish state. 
Since the mid-1980s, however, proponents of a ‘grey’ shade have begun to push 
successfully for a Kurdish opening in the media and in the political arena, 
breaking most of the taboosz4 surrounding the issue. For them, conceiving and 
practising politics in terms exclusively of preserving national unity have not 
produced a democratic outlook and conditions conducive for a pluralist 
democracy. Thus, in their view, it would be a delusion to base the future Kurdish 
policy of the state solely on a mechanistic interpretation of unitarism and on the 
conventional recipe of controlling and coopting. The prognosis that follows is 
that the primary emphasis must shift from ‘preserving’ to ‘democratising-and- 
preserving’ what Turkey has. The dominant conviction is that a democratic 
unitary state based on the codewords of conciliation, tolerance and genuine 
political pluralism, and organised around multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi- 
ideological groups can work in Turkey, although it may seem to be coming apart 
elsewhere. 
To what extent has the Turkish radical nationalist camp and its party, the 
NLP, been sharing the ‘grey’ thinking which is emerging at all levels of society as 
a fresh alternative? The Turkist wing of the hyper-nationalist movement is 
reacting to Kurdish nationalism the way it reacted to Alevi-‘communism’ in the 
1970s. The leader of the party can be heard referring to ‘Kurds’ and making pleas 
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for a peaceful and democratic co-existence with them, while die-hard militants 
scattered around the heavily Turkish areas try to instigate violent Turkish 
reaction against Kurdish neighbours, friends, colleagues, and employees, and to 
block any ‘grey’ consideration of the Kurdish question. 
Nevertheless, it is the influence of the dramatic changes in Turkish politics 
mainly brought about by an unprecedented ‘opening up’ to the outside world in 
the post-1980 era that produced the moderate genre, the ‘grey’ists. There is no 
reason to think that the flow of the stream can be turned backwards. 
Global constraints and official nationalism 
The movement toward political democracy and economic liberalisation which 
these external developments promoted in most of the Third World also had an 
impact on Turkey’s internal politics, in terms of an increasing priority on issues 
related to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, especially since the 
October 199 1 general elections. 25 This ‘external push’ for democracy has been an 
increasing part of Turkish politics since the country applied for full membership 
in the European Community (EC) in 1987. Although the Community has not 
responded with enthusiasm, the idea of a prospective integration with Europe, 
even at an unknown future date, has been a source of strength for secular 
democratic values and trends in the country. The same cannot be said for the 
radical Islamist and hyper-nationalist forces whose commitment to the same 
values and practices is open to question. 
Political developments in the Turkic-Muslim republics in the former Soviet 
Caucasus and Central Asia in turn have had a major impact on the nationalist 
and Islamist stances in Turkey. The current aspirations for democratisation and 
free market capitalism sweeping through that part of the world have reinforced 
the secular and modernising aspects of Kemalist ideology, both inside Turkey 
and in those republics. These new republics are in need of external support and 
guidance for transforming their systems which so far were insulated from any 
Western influence. There are two models they could emulate: either the secular 
and politically more open model of Turkey, or the fundamentalist framework of 
Iran. The dynamics of this transition period are full of signs that in this 
competition between the two countries over providing a prototype of 
development, Turkey has natural advantages based on its close historical and 
cultural ties with its Turkic cousins. Turkey’s rising importance in the region is 
also a welcome development to its key ally, the U.S., which is trying to create a new 
balance of power in the former Soviet Union favorable to American interests, 
and is attempting to preclude any expansion and consolidation of Iranian 
influence in the region. 
Turkey has embarked on a spate of diplomatic activity by exchanging visits of 
envoys, opening embassies, signing various economic and cultural agreements, 
and establishing satellite television broadcasts to the six Muslim republics. These 
moves toward the Turkic states have caused concern in some Western circles that 
the Ottoman Empire is resurrecting itself and that official Turkish nationalism 
has started to acquire an expansionist and aggressive character. This perspective 
misses the Turkish reality and misreads the changing direction and substance of 
Turkish foreign policy, which is characterised by pragmatic economic 
considerations in which irredentism, expansionism, and a desire for power are 
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uncalled for. ‘Ankara’s new attitude toward ethnic Turkic groups in Azerbaijan 
and the former Soviet Central Asian republics is based on pragmatic foreign 
policy considerations rather than on ideological concerns. The Turks expect to 
gain major economic benefits from the development of closer ties with Uzbeks, 
Kazakhs, Kirghis, Turkmens, and Azerbaijanis’. In short, Turkish efforts in the 
region aim at exploiting the economic possibilities of a massive market and at 
being a window and a link to the capitalist West, which is thought to be the best 
answer to the problems of economic liberalism. 
The official Turkish stand has not moved away from its long-term 
commitment to staying within the Western bloc and pressing for entry into the 
EC. Ankara has not been facing a policy choice between being a member of the 
democratic community of the West and the Muslim-Turkic community of 
Central Asia, since it perceives them to be reconcilable options. In any event, 
since the Turkish application to the EC has been put aside pending resolution of 
the Eastern European membership question, it is not surprising that Europe’s 
‘forgotten ally’*’ has no choice but to move as fast as possible to reap the 
maximum economic benefits from relations with the Turkic republics and help 
its own painful economic transition process. 
The immense political changes outside the country, especially in Central Asia, 
which radical nationalists have always claimed as Turkish ancestoral land, have 
inevitably had their greatest impact on hyper-nationalist forces and organisations 
in the 1990s. Similarly, the increasing intensity in the past several years of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement inside the country has also become a pivotal issue 
for the same forces and organisations to reposition and remobilise themselves. 
The vision of a pan-Turkish Central Asia show an ideological obstinacy on the 
part of hyper-nationalist forces. These new states are totally unlikely to submit 
themselves to the shackles of a united pan-Turkist Empire, having already 
broken the shackles of dependence on another one. In other words, those nations 
have learnt the costs of compromising their sovereignty and sacrificing their 
individuality for a super-national political identity. Moreover, they are deeply 
aware of their national cultural values due to the former Soviet policy of divide 
and rule. 
To put it differently, since the states there are coterminous with the nation, 
there is really less need for nationalism to be radical than it would be in 
fragmented societies with little sense of a common national consciousness. The 
difficulties encountered there are related to managing the process of 
transformation to the ‘global’ as opposed to a ‘national’ political culture of 
democracy, and to a viable model of capital accumulation and development 
integrated with the world economy. On all these counts, the hyper-nationalist 
cadres in Turkey have not renewed their rather arid and anachronistic political 
philosophy to incorporate new postures and strategies appealing to the new 
clientele. The authoritarian precepts of the NLP, for instance, are hardly likely to 
respond to the need to create the global political culture of democracy in Central 
Asia. 
The transformation process in the Turkic republics has also had significant 
consequences for the fate of fundamentalist Islam at home. Having strengthened 
itself in the 198Os, the movement now is interested in ‘Muslim’ Central Asia as a 
potential site for an Islamist upsurge which will bolster the movement’s morale 
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and prestige and solidify its base at home. However, post-independence politics 
do not offer much optimism for Islam as being the source of legitimation for the 
emerging forms of state power. 
To begin with, although Islamic identity as part of the culture is strong in these 
republics, the process of secularisation is well advanced. Given the predominantly 
secular outlook of the Muslim populace in these republics-a product of over 70 
years of communist rule-and the widespread admiration for the modernising 
reforms of Kemal Atattirk, the chances for radical Islam to make headway in the 
republics seem to be very slim. On the contrary, it is Turkey’s blending of 
Westernisation with secularism which provides an attractive model for these 
republics. 
Consequently, any chance of success for Islamic fundamentalism in the region 
depends on the prospect of a growing antagonism between state and society in 
these republics. This in turn would reflect a political and economic 
performance-failure of the post-independence states. The other possibility of 
gaining any fundamentalist foothold in these societies lies in the evolution of 
politico-ethnic conflicts, like the one between Azerbaijan and Armenia over 
Karabagh, into a Muslim-Christian war. Under the impact of such uncertain 
conditions, radical Islam in Turkey has now entered into a phase of ‘political 
quietism’: taking stock, presenting a much more moderate face than in the 
previous decade, and consolidating its support. In short, fundamentalists are 
biding their time in the hope of a future opening produced not only by popular 
support in Turkey itself, but also by external ethno-political developments. 
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